EVALUATION AS KNOWLEDGE GENERATOR AND PROJECT IMPROVER. LEARNING FROM DEMAND-SIDE CAMPAIGNS AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS

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ABSTRACT. Efforts against trafficking in human beings increased in the last two decades. Although considerable funds are devoted, little is known about their effectiveness, mainly due to a lack of or insufficient evaluation. This article reviews the quality of and insights from available evaluation reports in the field of demand-side anti-trafficking campaigns. Such campaigns seek to induce behavior change, particularly to abstain from buying goods produced or services delivered under circumstances of exploitation, or to report suspicions to helplines or police. The examination pursues three questions: How are these campaigns supposed to work? What is known about their results? How can learning from campaign experiences be improved? Available evaluation reports show that reporting campaigns tend to work like a funnel. Hundreds of thousands people are targeted but only a handful of people will ever be in a situation to behave as recommended. Messages designed to attract attention can be misunderstood and induce harmful side-effects for victims and suspects. The findings suggest that the watering-can principle of showering time and resources to an external evaluation of each and every project is not appropriate. It is more convincing to select a small share of funded projects for intensive external evaluation and give more support to low-budget internal evaluation for all projects.

Keywords: social justice; anti-trafficking measures; evaluation; demand-side; campaigns

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1. Introduction

Projects aiming to establish or restore social justice inevitably fall short of completely accomplishing targeted impacts. When interventions go wrong, they even engender results contrary to the initial intentions and do harm to the target group (Scott, 1998). When they work well, a desired improvement can be reached while unanticipated side-effects and unintended consequences remain manageable and – once identified – can be addressed by subsequent interventions. Besides academic research, evaluation offers a systematic approach for the exploration what went well and what went badly (Atkin and Rice, 2013a). Evaluation includes, where possible, not only an assessment of “what has happened; it also considers why something has occurred” and “how much has changed as a consequence” (European Commission, 2015: 49; similarly UNEG, 2016: 10). It seeks to establish a causal and quantitative link between the intervention and any change. In times of “fake news” and “alternative facts,” evaluation becomes even more important as a knowledge-generator and project-improver.

Today, evaluation of publicly funded programs is accepted and promoted as an intrinsic part of democratic government. Evaluation ideally serves accountability, increases the knowledge base for legislation and implementation, informs the public and helps to develop, within agencies, the orientation towards challenge and improvement (Chelimsky, 2006: 42).

The decisively positive attitude is principally shared among political bodies and policy-makers at international and European levels. United Nations’ bodies use to stress the importance of evaluation, among UN Women,¹ UNODC² and UNDP³ – all referring to “norms and standards for evaluation” as developed since 2005 by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG, 2016). Similarly, other internationally active bodies like the German GIZ⁴ or IOM⁵ emphasize the benefits of evaluation. At European level, the Commission expresses a strong commitment to evaluation of publicly funded programs (European Commission, 2015: 49), including interventions against trafficking in human beings (Dottridge, 2007a: 28). In this article, we examine the efforts to evaluate anti-trafficking campaigns.

In the last decade, a considerable amount of money has been invested in anti-trafficking interventions. Private funders supported anti-slavery and anti-trafficking projects worldwide in the three-year period 2012–2014 with US$ 223 million (Suhr, 2016: 3). Several Directorates General of the European Commission spent a total of €158.5 million on 321 anti-trafficking projects between 2004 and 2015 (Walby et al., 2016: 7). However, in spite of the expressed high esteem for evaluation, most anti-trafficking projects are not at all or not thoroughly evaluated (GAO, 2007; Van der Laan et al., 2011; Hames et al., 2011; Davy, 2016; Bryant and Joudo, 2016). A study on EU-funded anti-trafficking interventions found that only about 5% of the 321 projects reviewed had been externally evaluated, and only around a third provided at least a narrative report by the principal grant-holder (Walby et al., 2016: 85). Another study attested the field of EU sponsored anti-trafficking interventions a “lack of evaluation” (Deloitte, 2015: 8). Even worse, the authors of one of the
few thoroughly conducted evaluations explained that they were incapable to assess outcomes, effectiveness and impacts due to lack of evaluability (Berman and Marshall, 2011).

Against this background, this article aims to contribute to an enhancement of evaluation efforts of social justice interventions by taking a specific kind of anti-trafficking intervention as reference case. We explore the evaluation of a particular set of publicly funded interventions: anti-trafficking campaigns addressing a demand-side with the purpose to promote a behavior change.

For the purpose of this study, a campaign is defined as a *series of coordinated communication activities seeking to influence what individuals think and do.* The standards for evaluation of this type of intervention are basically consistent with general evaluation approaches and standards (Valente and Kwan, 2013). As a special feature, campaigns seek to raise awareness of an issue with the purpose to promote either policy change or individual behavior changes – or, often, a combination of both (Coffman, 2002; 2003). Only campaigns with the target to influence what individuals do are considered to be behavior-change campaigns – i.e. those which call on people to change behavior and take conscious action (see Atkin and Rice, 2012).

Over the last decade, in addition to classical awareness-raising campaigns, behavior-change campaigns have gained importance in the context of anti-trafficking efforts. Initially, these campaigns addressed people in major migrant regions considered to be at risk of becoming a victim of trafficking, or to victims already in the receiving countries. These campaigns called on potential victims both to be aware that promises made by migration facilitators may turn out to be false and merely a way of luring them into a situation of exploitation and trafficking, or to know their rights in case they become victims of human trafficking (Andrijasevic and Anderson, 2009; Nieuwenhuys and Pecoud, 2007).

Another type of behavior-change campaign addresses a “demand-side.” Anti-trafficking campaigns are considered here as *demand-side campaigns* • either if they address people as consumers who knowingly or unknowingly *pay for the work or services of trafficked persons* (spending shift campaigns) or • if they address the *general public* expected to make observations of seemingly suspicious occurrences of exploitation, often in a consumption context (reporting campaigns).

Such campaigns gained relevance in the context of anti-trafficking interventions with the adoption of the UN Trafficking in Persons Protocol in 2000. This document provides the main point of reference for present-day debates on trafficking in human beings (Vlassis, 2000). It introduced a definition of trafficking and included a vague reference to “demand.” The Protocol defines “trafficking in persons” as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for
the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploi-
tation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery,
servitude or the removal of organs (UN Trafficking Protocol, Article 3).

The offence “trafficking in persons” is a complex legal construction that refers to a
wide range of real world phenomena (see Cyrus and Vogel, 2015). While “traffick-
ing in persons” is often publicly referred to as selling people, the UN Trafficking
Protocol merge three elements into a complex definition: acts, means and purposes.
The first element refers to acts of recruitment and transfer that are not punishable
per se but become only outlawed as trafficking when the two other elements – illicit
means (like coercion or fraud) as the second element and the purpose of exploitation
as the third – simultaneously occur. The Protocol does not provide a definition of
exploitation per se but alludes to its meaning by enumerating some of the purposes
of exploitation.

The Protocol included for the first time in international anti-trafficking efforts
(Cyrus, 2015) a reference to “demand”: “States Parties shall adopt or strengthen
legislative or other measures, such as educational, social or cultural measures,
including through bilateral and multilateral cooperation, to discourage the demand
that fosters all forms of exploitation of persons, especially women and children,
that leads to trafficking” (UN Trafficking Protocol, Article 9, para 5).

Subsequently, references to “demand” were included in several policy documents
at international, regional and national levels (Ham, 2011; Wijers, 2015). However,
demand is neither defined in the protocol nor in later international policy documents
such as the “Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human
Beings”7 as of 2005 and by EU Directive 2011/36/EU.8 Consequently, demand-
related arguments occur in anti-trafficking debates in a broad range of different and
often vague meanings (Cyrus, 2015; Vogel, 2016).

As already mentioned, in the last two decades, donors have spent a considerable
amount of money supporting campaigns aiming to reduce trafficking in human
beings, including those tackling the offence from a “demand-side.” The key question
explored in this article is how spending-shift and reporting campaigns impact on
situations outlawed as trafficking in human beings, and how the effects of such
campaigns can be assessed. These questions can be answered by original academic
research or by evaluation. In this article, we focus on the evaluation of campaigns.
We take evaluation reports on demand-side campaigns simultaneously as source
and subject of the study. We review the quality of evaluation reports and explore
what they have to say about the working and effectiveness of anti-trafficking cam-
paigns addressing a demand-side. In addition, we consider how to enhance cam-
paigns’ effectiveness. The double aim of this analysis is utilizing available evalu-
ation insights for an improvement of knowledge of the effectiveness of campaigns
and, vice versa, to develop proposals for an improvement of demand-side campaigns’
evaluation. The examination pursues three questions:
• How are these campaigns supposed to work?
• What is known about their results?
• How can we improve learning from the experiences of campaigns?

The analysis is restricted to campaigns addressing a situation in which an addressee of the campaign and a potential victim of trafficking are co-present in the same location. This is the case, for example, when someone buys a meal or a personal service or donates to a beggar. We do not deal with campaigns addressing a situation where goods are produced under exploitative labor conditions at great distance from final consumers. Interventions targeting the demand for goods produced and services delivered in the contexts of global supply chains are not covered here (but see McGrath and Mieres, 2017).

We start with an introduction into established evaluation standards and terminology (section 2). We then explain the intervention logic as methodological tool for analysis and demonstrate its application (section 3). In section 4, we introduce into the sample of evaluation reports of demand-side campaigns, assess the quality of the reports and compile insights concerning effects and impacts (section 4). Finally, we offer a key recommendation for an improvement of efforts to evaluate campaigns more consistently (section 5).

2. Evaluation as the Basis of Analysis

This section opens with a short introduction of established evaluation standards that serve as frame of reference for the assessment of the quality of evaluation (2.1). Subsequently, we introduce the evaluation concepts and terminology guiding our analysis (2.2).

2.1 Evaluation standards

According to established professional standards, evaluation seeks to provide evidence of causality. Consequently, the design has to include experimental and quasi-experimental techniques such as pre- and post-test surveys or focus-group discussions with systematic control-group comparison (Farrington, 2003; van der Knaap et al., 2008). For several reasons, such experiments are often not possible – for example, because required evaluation resources are disproportionally high, or because the intervention aims to impact hard-to-measure issues such as trafficking in human beings. Surveys addressing campaigns aiming to change socially undesirable behavior have an inherent problem – campaigns simultaneously change the understanding of a socially desirable answer. Measurement of self-reported behavior “is subject to error because of the tendency to over-report socially desirable behavior” (Freimuth et al., 2001: 486). Therefore, in surveys it is virtually impossible to distinguish whether a person’s behavior has changed in the desired way or whether s/he only pretends to have done so (visibility effect). Similarly, crime statistics on trafficking in human beings are dependent on public perceptions of the issue (Brown et al.,
Efforts to hide or mask undesirable behavior affect criminal statistics or other enforcement data, which are highly dependent on reporting by victims and witnesses.

However, even if “gold standard” scientific evidence cannot always be provided, standards have been developed to ensure the quality of evaluations. The “Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation” published in 1981 a widely recognized set of standards that was subsequently further developed (Sanders, 2006). Other important fields for the evaluation of interventions are health policies and developmental aid. The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (DAC) has developed concrete principles and standards of evaluation for the assessment of international aid projects (DAC, 1991; 2010).

The United Nations built on these standards when introducing a special body, the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), which developed “norms for evaluation” (UNEG, 2005a) and translated the normative requirements into practical “standards for evaluation” by – for example – detailed recommendations for the structure and content of the final evaluation report (e.g. Standard 4 with 18 items) (UNEG, 2005b). UNEG recommendations are ambitious with regard to their scope, but they also include some reservations that allow evaluation efforts to adapt to specific purposes and small budgets. UNEG Standard 4 instructs that all questions should be addressed to the highest extent possible, and limitations of knowledge should be clearly acknowledged.10

In the case of demand-side campaigns, demanding strong evidence for the causality of an intervention would be asking too much. Some experts argued that change can never be attributed to campaigns alone in complex contexts (Atkin and Rice, 2012; Raab and Rocha, 2011: 272). However, evaluations can concentrate “on determining if a credible and defensible case can be made” instead of attempting to prove a definitive causation (Coffman, 2009: 5). In addition, evaluation should indicate the strengths and weaknesses of the evidence presented and its meaning for conclusions and recommendations (European Commission, 2015: 50).

2.2 Introduction to the evaluation approach

Evaluation involves a systematic analysis of interventions and a value judgement (Sanders, 2006: 28).11 In other words: Evaluators ask what happened and why, and whether or not it was beneficial. To describe the effects of interventions, evaluators usually rely on a model with the standardized components of objective, input, output, outcome and impact. These components are applied in evaluations in a similar way.

Inputs (available funds, staff hours) provide the resources that allow for activities (outputs) which are supposed to have effects (outcomes) in line with aims (objectives). Objectives relate to changes deemed to be beneficial. Ultimately, campaigns aim at something beyond an outcome – namely at impact, “the big changes and benefits being sought for people, services, or systems” (Coffman, 2009: 6). In the cases of interest to this study, the intended consequence is the reduction of trafficking in human beings in particular, and the suffering from severe forms of exploitation
in general (Wijers, 2015). With regard to objectives pursued by campaigners, the indication of a campaign’s intended consequences implicitly highlights the issue of unexpected outcomes – usually perceived to be harmful and undesirable side-effects. The term “impact” is therefore also used for the unintended consequences impacting on real-world problems (Coffman, 2009: 6). However, some side-effects may be appreciated by campaigners as additional, unexpected benefits (see section 3.2).

In this article, we focus on the application of one evaluation tool: the explication of an intervention logic, consisting of a description of “the expected chain of events by using a simplified model of causality” while taking context into account (European Commission, 2015: 54). An intervention logic is often visualized in a map and ideally clearly set out at the beginning of a campaign and build into its design. If campaigners have failed to explicate an intervention logic, a basic prerequisite for evaluation is a reconstruction of how the campaign is supposed to work in terms of assumed causal chains of outcomes (Coffman, 2009: 6). The intervention logic is embedded in a theory of change that places an intervention and its components in a broader context.

Intervention logic is sometimes introduced without a clear distinction or even as synonymous with “theory of change” or “logic model.” However, we suggest to clearly distinguish: Intervention logic follows the assumed causal chain of intended effects of one single intervention. It is part of a theory of change which – in our understanding – considers the interaction of the intervention logics of more than one activity pursued in one project or program. While changes in a complex environment can never be attributed to one intervention alone (Raab and Rocha, 2011: 272), it is still useful to stipulate how an intervention is supposed to contribute to change in a pragmatic one-dimensional representation.

Ideally, a theory of change is derived from problem analysis. Therefore, guides to the planning of measures usually recommend beginning with a thorough problem analysis (Christ and Aranaz, 2008). The professional standards are ambitious: “Designing and implementing effective campaigns requires a disciplined approach where the campaign team performs a thorough situational analysis, develops a theory-based but pragmatic strategic plan, and implements the creation and placement of messages in accordance with principles of effective media practices (Atkin and Freimuth, 2013: 53). In this view, a campaign should only be planned if problem analysis shows that it is a promising instrument to address drivers of a problem.

However, we start from the empirical observation that the impulse for launching campaigns does not always evolve from problem analysis but from donor’s incentives. In the field of anti-trafficking interventions, campaigns are launched because donors provide funds earmarked for demand-side campaigns with the aim of reducing trafficking in human beings. International organizations and NGOs respond to these incentives. However, also in such cases, the project design necessarily implies an – albeit implicit – underlying assumption about the causation and drivers
of a problem and about the instruments to tackle them. Our objective is neither to analyze a problem (but see Vogel, 2016; Vogel and Cyrus, 2017) nor to construct an ideal theory of change. Instead, we analyze real campaigns in order to reconstruct the underlying intervention logic. Our understanding of the basic model of the intervention logic underlying campaigns aiming at behavior change is set out in figure 1 (Coffman, 2003). The figure indicates how evaluation terminology and methodology can be applied to behavior-change campaigns.

**Figure 1** Theoretical construction of the intervention logic of a behavior-change campaign

Communication campaigns consist of activities that disseminate messages through different channels (Atkin and Rice, 2013a). They can be conducted because of available inputs. The campaign budget is then used to produce outputs, for example, to print leaflets. In addition, donated inputs or organization's own resources may be used in several ways: Organizations allow staff to work on a campaign during their paid time (donation of staff hours). Volunteers are engaged in campaigns (donated volunteer time) and products and services can be donated (e.g. printing flyers or allocating time for placing announcements on TV without requiring the usual payment). All these inputs allow for outputs, i.e. communication activities – for example a TV spot, a website, a press conference or the printing and distribution of a leaflet. These activities are expected to induce particular outcomes.

The links between behavioral outcomes and intended impacts – in other words the underlying assumptions – can also be subject to evaluation. According to Chelimsky (2006: 47), the study of underlying assumptions can be called “knowledge evaluation.” It addresses “those beliefs enshrined in the hearts and minds of officials and practitioners that may not stand up under examination.” For example, if a campaign calls on a target group to report suspicious observations to the police, the impacts depend not only on the campaigners’ efforts but also on police’s responses. A campaign may fail to have an impact in spite of successfully having reached the target group because suspicious observations are – for whatever reason – not consistently and effectively investigated and followed up by law enforcement agencies. In such a case, campaign organizers may have done a perfect job, yet their campaign still did not have the intended impact on the social problem. Consequently, Dorfman and Wallack (2013: 335) emphasize the necessity to “create the environments in which information campaigns have better chances of achieving their goals” (see also Rice and Foot, 2013).
Evaluation efforts often end after the analysis of outputs, or the more-or-less-immediate outcomes. Evaluation research argue that such a narrow attention neglects, for example, the relevance and the potential of indirect effects and underestimates the effect of addressing opinion leaders as interpersonal influencers (Atkin and Rice, 2013b: 6–8). Against the background of our observations, we argue that a focus on immediate outcomes is linked to a distorted understanding of evaluation. Campaigners in the anti-trafficking field believe that the consequence of evaluation implies in practical terms a judgement whether campaigners worked well and not whether campaigns worked well. Against this background, it is reasonable that campaigners prefer evaluation testifying the accomplishment of intended effects. It is the responsibility of donors to support an evaluation-friendly attitude (Cyrus and Vogel, 2017b).

3. Intervention Logic – Theoretical Reflections on How Campaigns Are Supposed to Work

As the preceding section has shown, theoretical considerations of how a campaign is supposed to work should be an integral part of any campaign planning and evaluation. However, these aspects have been largely neglected so far. This section therefore presents theoretical considerations how campaigns work in general terms and how demand-side campaigns in the anti-trafficking field work in particular terms (3.1). Subsequently, we provide a short re-appraisal of side-effects (3.2) and assess the risks and side-effects of anti-trafficking campaigns (3.3). We conclude the section with a typology of demand-side campaigns and their effects (3.4).

3.1 Campaign- and field-specific intervention logics

Campaign intervention logics can be divided into campaign-specific and field-specific logics. The campaign-specific logic addresses the assumed causal chain from output to final outcome. It is similar for all campaigns aimed at behavior change, independent of the topic. The field-specific logic addresses the assumed causal chain from the derived final outcome to the intended impact in the real world and refers to subsequent changes in a specific field with a specific logic (see figure 2).

Figure 2 presents the relation of campaign-specific and field-specific logics for demand-side campaigns aiming to reduce or eliminate exploitation and trafficking of human beings.
Figure 2 Intervention logics of demand-side campaigns

The campaign-specific logic
Campaign effects on the outcome level can be divided into a sequence of steps (see figure 2). For the sake of clarity, we have grouped them into immediate, intermediate and final outcome. The refinement and grouping of steps can vary according to the matter of interest. In the case of our study, we propose the following outcome stages:

- **Immediate outcome**: people are exposed to and take notice of the message, for example by reading it on a poster or by listening to it on the radio.
- **Intermediate outcome**: people understand the message, find it relevant for themselves, accept the message and form an intention to behave according to the message. For example, they understand that they should not buy specific goods and find the message relevant because they have purchased them before, they accept that they should not buy them anymore and form an intention not to do so in the future.
- **Final outcome**: When they have the opportunity to behave according to the message, they remember their intentions and behave accordingly (e.g. the good is offered to them and they do not buy it).

In other words: Addressees notice the message, want to do something and do it. However, even if the final behavioral outcome is attained, the subsequent question is whether behavior change does impact the addressed social problem.

The field-specific logic
Ongoing debates on anti-trafficking efforts are neither based on nor provide a consistent general model of the factors of a demand-side of trafficking. This comes as no surprise, as the offence of trafficking in human beings potentially encompasses a wide range of social phenomena in different fields (Cyrus and Vogel, 2015). Problem analysis before conducting a campaign can indicate whether such an impact is likely for the specific field and determine observable indicators. After a campaign has been conducted, an evaluation can investigate if and to what extent these indicators occur. Principally, field-specific theories are required in order to
explain how behavior change is supposed – according to the expectations of anti-trafficking campaigners – to reduce trafficking in human beings.

Debates about the factors impacting acts outlawed as trafficking in human beings show one important commonality: a supply chain with (at least) three stages is assumed. For example, the Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in Persons (ICAT, 2014: 4) differentiated three types of agents – consumers, employers and brokers resp. agents. Aronowitz and Koning (2014: 670) describe a “business chain” with three distinct groups: the customers resp. clients of trafficked persons (primary demand), the employers of (trafficked) sex workers, and third parties involved in the trafficking process (recruiters, travel agents, transporters). Wheaton et al. (2010: 124–130) construct the “ultimate” consumer as the “fautor,” the employer as the exploiter and the trafficker as the intermediary.

Adopting these ideas, we describe the contexts of consumption, production and recruitment as three relevant stages in the process of trafficking in human beings (Cyrus and Vogel, 2015).

- **In a consumption context**, people spend money on goods that are produced with an involvement of persons trapped in exploitation, or receive services from such persons. Thus, consumers knowingly or unknowingly feed exploitation through their spending.
- **Production context** is here used, in a wide sense, as any context in which income is generated through activities usually within an organization, with an organizer (manager, operator, entrepreneur, business owner, employer) and persons working on specific tasks in the organization (employees, dependent workers, self-employed contractors).
- **For the recruitment context**, it is assumed that organizers can use intermediaries instead of directly recruiting workers. If the intermediary has control over a person and transfers this control to an organizer, this transfer is often depicted as “sale” of persons. However, the transfer of persons without any agency options can also be considered as a special case, separate from the more general case in which intermediaries receive a payment for providing access to the labor force of persons with limited agency options. Depending on the circumstances, such recruitment actions can also be legally sanctioned as trafficking in human beings.

Demand-side campaigns do not directly address trafficking acts, i.e. the transfer into exploitation, because such transfers are usually not visible to consumers. The link between consumer demand and trafficking is indirect – the change in consumer behavior should reduce exploitative relations in the production context in order to reduce incentives for organizers in the production context to demand the transfer of easily exploitable persons from intermediaries.

The theoretical analysis of the intervention logics of demand-side campaigns leads to three conclusions:

1. The consideration of the campaign-specific logic points to the fact that awareness raising as such is not sufficient for campaigns ultimately seeking to change behavior.
2. The consideration of the field-specific logic points to the fact that demand-side campaigns can only have a reducing effect on trafficking acts if they have an effect on exploitation. Therefore, the more logical primary target of campaigns is the more general reduction of exploitation, which implies the narrower target of reduction of trafficking acts.

3. Even the simplified intervention logic consists of quite a long chain of effects. An interruption of the chain at any point means that the campaign has no impact on trafficking via the behavior of the target group. Defects at any stage will water down the final impact on trafficking in human beings.

3.2 A short re-appraisal of side-effects

Having introduced the supposed workings of demand-side campaigns, we now turn to the consideration of potential effects beyond the intervention logic. As a general rule campaigns generate some unintended side-effects because participants in communication processes have potential freedoms to interpret messages. Based on their own anchorings in material experiences, they may accept, resist, or reject behavioral recommendations (Dervin and Foreman-Wernet, 2013: 147).

Analysis of side-effects of purposeful human action has a long tradition in social sciences (Merton, 1936). Unintended consequences occur in addition to the desired effect of an action either considered by campaigners as detrimental or as an unexpected effect appreciated as positive.

Unintended effects may be interpreted as positive or negative, short term or long term, or occurring at individual or societal level. (...) It is not always possible to foresee and mitigate all the different types of unintended effects, such as hysteria or panic, knowledge gaps, discrimination and scapegoating, confusion and misunderstanding, and potential boomerang effects. (...) Often, campaign planers and evaluators attempt to control for unintended effects through extensive formative research and the inclusion of multiple control (Salmon and Murray-Johnson, 2013: 107).

Side-effects can also be accepted consciously and appreciated as an expected additional benefit or can be deplored as seemingly unavoidable collateral damage (Dottridge, 2007b). In the following discussion we distinguish between the side-effects of demand-side campaigns according to their desirability from the campaigners’ point of view.

Desirable side-effects: If a campaign leads to side-effects perceived as desirable by campaigners, it means it has delivered expected additional benefits. The occurrence of desirable side-effects may be invoked as an argument that a campaign is successful in spite of its having failed to realize the primary objective of behavior change in a consumption context, particularly if it raises awareness of the issue at stake or increases support for a policy. In addition, it may promote a positive image of the campaigning organization and increase donations for its services. Supporting policy change and encouraging donations are identified as the two most important desirable side-effects of campaigns.
Instead of speaking of desirable side-effects, nevertheless, we could have spoken of campaigns with multiple objectives. However, for the purpose of our analysis, we discarded this option as it distracts from the question of whether a campaign can impact on trafficking in human beings through behavior changes on the demand-side. We argue that a demand-side campaign should not be deemed successful when desirable side-effects were achieved without the primary behavioral objective being achieved.

Undesirable side-effects: In order to attract attention, campaigns set a stimulus, usually a concise image and a catchy slogan highlighting a particular aspect of it. If a campaign fails to attract attention, it has no chance of selling its message to the target audience. The choice of aspect presented unavoidably triggers a series of mental associations that contextualize the central message that campaigners intend to convey. Mental associations influence how a stimulus is perceived and a message understood and in which context the message is remembered. A recipient initially exposed to a campaign stimulus can respond in a spontaneous and unconscious way. Spontaneous understanding can—and often does—deviate from the meaning that campaigners attribute to a verbal or pictorial message (Dervin and Foreman-Wernet, 2013). The underlying psychological mechanisms are conceptualized as “thinking fast,” in contrast to slow, systematic and deliberate consideration of a problem (Kahneman, 2012). In the designing of campaigns, the “fast thinking” has to be taken into account.

3.3 Assessing risks and side-effects
Careful reflection on potential undesirable side-effects may help campaigners to reduce or contain the risk, or to favor other actions for the same purpose—instead of a campaign—when the risk of collateral damage is not controllable (McGuire, 2013). In this section, we briefly outline specific campaign features that may lead to undesirable side-effects.

Extreme stories and imagery
The prevalent visualization in anti-trafficking interventions is the “stereotypical image” of the victim as “a young, innocent, foreign woman tricked into prostitution abroad. She is battered and kept under continuous surveillance so that her only hope is police rescue (…)” (Andrijasevic and Mai, 2016: 2). Victims of human trafficking are often visualized through images of chains, locks or injuries. Often, young fragile-looking females are chosen as examples. When the life-story of a victim of trafficking is used as an intense storyline in a campaign, it is sending a clear and unambiguous message. This type of dramatic portrait is useful for attracting attention and triggering feelings of pity, pointing to the urgent need for help (Feingold, 2010; Gopaldas, 2014; Vance, 2012). While being instrumental in attracting donors and support for policy change, these extreme stories and imagery in demand-side campaigns may also have unintended side-effects. Victims may be overlooked or considered undeserving if their situation is characterized by different or less-visible features of being trapped in exploitation, or because they are not able to tell their
story in a coherent way. For example, stereotypical portrayals could imply that it is
easy to categorize a person either as a powerless victim of trafficking or as an
unworthy prostitute (Krsmanovic, 2016). If a person’s story is doubted, she may be
sanctioned as an irregular immigrant or an undeclared employee working illegally
(Dottridge, 2007b; Hoyle et al., 2011; Srikantiah, 2007).

Extreme portrayals of perpetrators as unscrupulous males who are part of a
mafia-style international criminal organization can have a similar effect. Empirical
research found that the evidence-base for the assumption that organized crime is
always involved in the trafficking of human beings is “woefully inadequate. (…) The
actors involved may be organized criminal groups, individual traffickers and
smugglers, or even friends and family or trafficking victims” (Vermeulen et al.,
2010: 247).

**Gender stereotyping**

As the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime indicated in its global report on
trafficking in human beings (UNODC, 2009a: 6), a “disproportionate number of
women are involved in human trafficking, not only as victims (which we knew),
but also as traffickers (first documented here). (…) Female offenders have a more
prominent role in present-day slavery than in most other forms of crime. This fact
needs to be addressed, especially the cases where former victims have become
perpetrators.”

The UNODC went on to add: “Surprisingly, in 30% of the countries which pro-
vided information on the gender of traffickers, women make up the largest propor-
tion of traffickers. In some parts of the world, women trafficking women is the
norm.”

Suspects who do not correspond to the stereotype may be overlooked – and thus
their victims may be too (O’Brien, 2013 and 2016; Siegel and Blank, 2010). Some
studies indicate that most workers trafficked into labor exploitation are male (ILO
2014). However, men are rarely represented as potential victims of trafficking in
human beings (Jones, 2010). Consequently, campaigns following and promoting
unsubstantiated gender stereotypes may have an effect that male victims and female
perpetrators will be overlooked.

**Sexualized images**

Sexualized images can be deployed to attract attention. If they are used in adver-
tising, the slogan “sex sells” characterizes strategies that use sex appeal to sell a
particular product or service. Similarly, images of attractive scantily-clad or naked
females can be used to draw attention to anti-trafficking campaigns (Krsmanovic,
2016), even though they compete with the frequent use of sexualized images in
selling goods such as underwear, perfumes or drinks. They may backfire and have
the effect of confirming a perception of women as available sex objects, even though
the intention is to eliminate this view (Andrijasevic, 2007).
Seemingly innocuous situations hiding extreme exploitation

Trafficking is portrayed as a ubiquitous crime, hidden behind seemingly innocuous facades and thus rendered invisible.\textsuperscript{18} Campaigns using this strategy suggest that trafficking victims can be encountered in a range of everyday life situations without anyone realizing. Such portrayals can produce a general feeling of insecurity and mistrust (O’Connell Davidson, 2006), either leading to the impression that nothing can be done or that the risk of reporting \textit{false suspicions} is too high.

Exhibiting undesirable behavior

Campaigns aiming to reduce undesirable behavior have to find a visual or verbal representation of this behavior. However, with this representation, a campaign may give the impression that a particular conduct is more widespread and thus more common and acceptable than it really is. For individuals who already abstain from such undesirable behavior, these impressions can produce unintended and undesirable “boomerang effects” (Byrne and Hart, 2009). As one review found, “...a college campaign targeting alcohol consumption might motivate students who previously consumed less alcohol than the norm to consume more” (Schultz et al., 2007: 430). Similarly, the continuous representation of men as buyers of sexual services may contribute to the impression that buying sex is a quite common behavior among men. This may have the effect of suggesting that young men need at least to try out the purchase of sexual services.

Visualizations with a specific complexion or dress-code

If campaigns work with one or two photos or more general pictures of victims, they unavoidably have to choose people with a specific complexion and clothing. Victims’ representations in pictures are perceived by recipients as Asian, African or European, belonging to the majority population of a country or to an ethnic or immigrated minority. Women may be dressed in clothing suggesting that she is selling sexual services, or children may wear shabby skirts, thus portraying Roma children who are sent out to beg.

Depending on the national context of the campaign, this may have undesirable side-effects for those groups that show similar visual features as those used in the campaign (Hatzinikolaou, 2015; Kuneviciute, 2012), potentially resulting in members of these groups being associated with stigmatized activities and crime in general, and making their access to regular housing and jobs more difficult.

Stigmatization of specific types of spending

Specific types of spending may generally be associated with trafficking in human beings – for example, spending on sexual services or cheap goods or donating to beggars. If the target group avoids this type of spending, this may have the undesired side-effect that persons who depend on the income from their sale of sexual services, cheap goods or begging may be deprived of it, without seeing any alternative action. “The simple removal of children from child labor does not work. It is important to ensure that systems are in place to ensure that children are not displaced into another
form of child labor or worse, into a situation of the worst form of child labor” (ILO, 2016: 3).

Poverty may be aggravated, making poor even more vulnerable to being trafficked into exploitation.

Offering simplistic behavioral solution
The temptation of demand-side campaigns lies in the suggestion that everybody can contribute something to the reduction of major problems through simple actions. This impression is strengthened by the prevalent use of an emotional and alarming language and visualization of “modern slavery,” suggesting “simplistic solutions to complex issues without challenging the structural and causal factors of inequality” (Andrijasevic and Mai, 2016: 1; O’Connell Davidson, 2015). If a campaign achieves a behavioral objective – e.g. a suspicious observation is reported – but has no effect on the underlying social problem, the campaign will merely serve as a moral relief. Thus, campaigns may have the function of promoting symbolic actions or policies that do not improve the lot of exploited persons.

3.4 A typology of demand-side campaigns and their effects
As already mentioned, the campaign-specific intervention logic is, in principle, similar for all campaigns while the field-specific logic differs depending on the type of campaign. Based on the analysis of similarities and differences in the key behavioral messages of real campaigns (see section 4), we developed a heuristic typology of demand-side campaigns. We identified two distinct intervention logics. The first logic aims to induce a change of individual or public patterns of spending money (spending-shift campaigns). The second logic aims to motivate individuals to report suspicious observations to a competent actor (reporting campaigns). Although some real campaigns combine advertising for spending-shift and reporting, the intervention logics of the approaches differ. The basic field-specific intervention logics are the following:

Spending-shift campaigns: Actors in the consumption context stop spending money on goods and services produced through exploitative means. Consequently, exploitative production and incentives to recruit vulnerable persons into such production decreases. Spending-shift campaigns are applied in three contexts.

• First, campaigns can ask people to abstain from giving money to specific groups of people. Most importantly, campaigns send out the message that people should not spend money when children are involved in begging or trying to sell petty goods like lighters, by supplying services like shoe-shining or playing music, or by accompanying adults in order to engender sympathy. Campaigners consider the spending of money in these situations as inherently harmful for children, keeping them away from school and providing an incentive for trafficking (Don’t-buy-from-children campaigns). Campaigns seek to generate the following chain of effects: Donors stop spending money to begging children → parents stop sending their children to beg or selling them to exploiters → children are sent to school. Of course, this would be the best possible result of a campaign. However, as field
specific detrimental outcome, the drying out begging as a source of income could lead to aggravated poverty in families (ILO, 2016) and to expose children to even more harmful forms of exploitation.20

• Second, a campaign can advise people to abstain from buying a specific good or service entirely. Most importantly, some campaigns promote the idea that men should not purchase commercial sexual services, assuming that this is inherently harmful to the women selling them and to society’s sense of justice, equality and morality as felt by the campaigners (Don’t-buy-sex campaigns). Campaigns seek to generate the following chain of effects (Waltman, 2011): Men stop demanding sexual services → Sex markets disappear → No women are recruited into sexual exploitation. However, when the purchase is criminalized – as proponents of Don’t-buy-sex campaigns call for – a decreased legal demand may lead to hidden forms of prostitution in which women are more vulnerable, or make them more vulnerable for other forms of exploitation (Östergren, 2017).

• Third, campaigns can advise people to shift spending within one category of substitutable goods and services away from those that are deemed likely to include the exploitation or trafficking of human beings at some stage of production and towards those for which this latter is unlikely. These campaigns promote fair or responsible consumption (Buy-responsibly campaigns). Campaigns seek to generate the following chain of effects: Purchasers abstain from buying a suspicious product → the market for unfairly produced goods disappears → Workers are no longer recruited into labor exploitation. However, since such campaigns take a low price as indicator of potential labor exploitation, a higher price does not necessarily signal fairer or exploitation-free labour conditions. When exploiters are able to create the impression that their production process is fair and above board, but continue to make use of exploited labour in less-visible segments of the supply chain or in outsourced segments, claiming their lack of responsibility, then higher prices can even increase the profits of exploiters (Kaleck and Saage-Maaß, 2016).

Reporting campaigns: Members of the public who observe suspicious situations are encouraged to report them. The key objective of this type of campaign is to identify forced labor or forced prostitution, to reduce these types of exploitation and the trafficking of persons into them, and to promote victim protection and perpetrator prosecution. Such campaigns seek to generate the following chain of effects: Suspicious observations are reported → Agents free the victims of exploitation or help them to free themselves → trafficking into such situations is deterred. However, also reporting campaigns may have field-specific detrimental outcomes.

The effects of reporting campaigns rely on the ability of observers to construe signs of coercion correctly. They could, obviously, be mistaken and inform for example on a worker who considers her or his service provision to be voluntary and who wants to continue earning a living in this way. In such a case, the person concerned would not appreciate interference of police inspection. If the person is an undocumented migrant, an inspection could result in deportation.21 In another configuration, the person is forced to provide services, but believes that police
intervention does not improve the situation. For example, exploiters could threaten to harm victims’ relatives in the country of origin, who cannot be protected by the receiving country authorities. The exploitative situation could also be a mixture of forced but partly paid labor, obliging the victim to send remittances to relatives in the origin context who are not aware of the circumstances. In such cases, too, the forced worker could consider her- or himself to be worse off following a criminal investigation.

It makes a big difference whether a helpline is run by a NGO or the police. If NGO consultants can make inquiries and offer help without immediately informing the police, the victim can decide for her- or himself what they consider to be in their own best interest.

When a forced worker is freed, this particular situation of exploitation ends. Whether freeing a forced worker leads to less exploitation in a business depends on the resulting sanction in the individual case and its deterrent effect on other business actors. Investigations leading to no or only to weak sanctions may have the opposite effect – instead of deterrence, they may send out a signal that the risks of disrespecting the rights of vulnerable people are calculable.

Even if increased reporting results in obliging business entrepreneurs to respect the rights of workers and offer them fair and secure working conditions, there could still be abuse in the recruitment context. Consider the case of a worker who borrows money from relatives to be smuggled into another country. The smuggler promises to take the person to a hotel where she can work. Upon arrival, the person is informed that the hotel work is no longer available, and that as only alternative a less attractive job is available. This latter would provide the worker with the possibility to earn money and pay back debts. If the worker feels forced to accept this offer, there may be no further use for illicit coercive means in the production context, but it would remain an abuse of vulnerability in the recruitment context (Vogel and Cyrus, 2017).

4. The Effects of Demand-side Campaigns –
Insights from the Analysis of Monitoring and Evaluation Reports

The theoretical considerations outlined in section 3 enable not only the construction of intervention logics of campaigns but also systematic considerations why campaigns may fail to generate the intended impact. However, only empirical analysis shed light on what actually happens in response to campaigns and why. Evaluation is a tool to assess effects and outcomes – ideally by searching for robust scientific evidence, as required by scientific quality standards, but more probably by making consistent arguments, supported by best possible evidence, as required in evaluation standards (see Section 2.2). This section introduces insights from an analysis of reports monitoring and evaluating demand-side anti-trafficking campaigns. First, we inform about the search and selection strategy (4.1). Then, we introduce the sample of evaluation reports (4.2) and asses the quality of the reports. Finally, we
demonstrate the idea of a jigsaw synthesis of the effects of the analyses reporting campaigns (4.3).

4.1 Search and selection strategy
The sample consists of eight evaluation reports. A set of techniques was applied in order to identify campaigns that match the selection criteria of sending a message calling for the behavior change of an individual in a consumption context in which the consumer/observer and the exploited person are in the same area:

- The social-scientific and evaluation literature was screened for references.
- A web search with keywords (trafficking, campaign, demand) was conducted in 2015 in both English and German.\(^\text{22}\)
- The website of the EU anti-trafficking coordinator\(^\text{23}\) was systematically screened with keywords and by reading the prevention section in country reports.
- The DemandAT project partners and the office of the EU anti-trafficking coordinator were asked to indicate relevant campaigns and to suggest which were worth analyzing in 2015.
- The resulting list was complemented in 2016 by screening newsletters relevant to the field of anti-trafficking policies for additional ongoing or new campaigns or the publication of evaluation reports.

The web search and the systematic screening of the prevention sections of the EU coordinator’s website yielded the most results. Partners mainly indicated campaigns that had already been identified in this way. A total of 55 anti-trafficking interventions seemed, at first glance, to match the selection criteria.\(^\text{24}\) These included references in reports without specification of any source for further information or a contact address (see Annex for a list of campaigns found).

After an intensive web-based search for additional information or a contact address, the sample was reduced to 21 campaigns, either because no contact could be identified or because they aimed at awareness-raising, policy change or donation-collecting without a message calling for the behavior change of an individual in a consumption context.

The most important criterion for selecting a campaign for closer analysis was the availability of sufficient evaluative information.\(^\text{25}\) In order to check for this availability, we contacted the office of the EU anti-trafficking coordinator and requested access to any available material they held about EU-sponsored projects. We were informed that the European Commission does not have an archiving policy or accessible database for evaluation reports for projects that it has funded.\(^\text{26}\) Reporting to the Commission contains evaluative elements, but project reports could not be forwarded without the permission of the grant-holders, so we were advised to contact project organizers individually for reports.

Subsequently, we approached the project coordinators of the 21 campaigns asking for access to any relevant material. Our request received only a few answers, either with an indication of how/where we could access the requested material or with confirmation that no evaluation was conducted. Thus, some individually con-
tacted anti-trafficking projects confirmed that no evaluation data is available while some others did not replied to requests for information. We were finally able to stock evaluation reports for eight campaigns or projects containing campaigns – four internal and four external. The finding that most campaigns were never formally evaluated is in line – as already indicated in the introduction – with findings from recent studies (GAO, 2007; Van der Laan et al., 2011; Hames et al., 2011; Schloenhardt et al., 2012; Deloitte, 2015; Walby, 2016: 85; Davy, 2016; Bryant and Joudo, 2016).

From the search and initial screening we learned that, in spite of the accounting efforts presented on the EU anti-trafficking coordinator’s website, it is not easy to locate detailed and evaluative information due to the lack of a repository.

4.2 Characteristics of evaluation reports
In this section, we introduce characteristics of the identified eight evaluation reports (for a summary of campaign characteristics, see table 1). These evaluation reports refer to eight campaigns, six of them conducted in a single country and two in more than one country. The campaigns all began in the period 2006 to 2014. A few campaigns were still ongoing. Three campaigns were part of a larger project and five were the major project activity. Accordingly, some evaluation reports covered beyond campaign also other performed activities. Also evaluation reports that devoted little space to or provided scanty information on the campaign were included in the sample when evaluators expressed a judgement on it. For the purpose of this exploration, only the campaign-related content was analyzed here.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign title</th>
<th>Lead organization</th>
<th>Start year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Campaign organization</th>
<th>Field of exploitation</th>
<th>Victim group</th>
<th>Type of message</th>
<th>Other aims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Stop Forced Prostitution</td>
<td>FIM Frankfurt</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Sexual</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Policy change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Don’t Be Afraid to Say It on Her Behalf</td>
<td>IOM Prague</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>Part of a project</td>
<td>Sexual</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Euro 08 Campaign against Trafficking in Women</td>
<td>FIZ Zurich</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Sexual</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Don’t Look Away (report sexual exploitation of children in travel and tourism!)</td>
<td>ECPAT</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>Part of a project</td>
<td>Sexual</td>
<td>Children</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Open Your Eyes, Be Aware!</td>
<td>Terres des Hommes</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>XK</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Begging</td>
<td>Children</td>
<td>Don’t Buy from Children; Report</td>
<td>Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Buy Responsibly</td>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Project</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Beer-Mat Campaign</td>
<td>Irish Immigrant Council</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>IE</td>
<td>Part of a project</td>
<td>Sexual</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Don’t Buy Sex; Report</td>
<td>Policy change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Victims of Child Trafficking – our responsibility (Victor)</td>
<td>Smile of the Child</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Part of a project</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Children</td>
<td>Don’t Buy from Children; Report</td>
<td>Awareness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ compilation from evaluation reports.
Five campaigns addressed trafficking for sexual exploitation; one covered trafficking for exploitation in begging and two looked at all forms of exploitation. With regard to the campaign type, both spending-shift and reporting campaigns are included. Most campaigns explicitly pursued objectives beyond encouraging specific behavior change, in particular raising awareness that exploitation and trafficking in human beings exists. Other identified additional objectives were policy change (2) or collection of donations (2). Only one of the eight sampled campaigns drew attention to men as probable victims; the others focused on women and/or children. The campaigns addressed people in their role as consumers and contractors, as tourists and travelers, as male buyers of commercial sexual services, as individuals donating to a begging child, as observers of a seemingly suspicious occurrence, as professionals encountering a suspicious case, or as members of the general public noticing seemingly suspicious occurrences.

4.3 Assessing the quality of evaluation reports
Interventions against trafficking in human beings usually refer to the UN definition of the trafficking offence. We therefore use the “norms and standards for evaluation” drawn up by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG, 2016) as a basic frame of orientation for the assessment of the quality of evaluation reports and formulated ten core question. The answer “Yes” indicates a high quality of evaluation.

In the following paragraphs, we compare these questions with the evaluation reports on projects consisting of or including demand-side campaigns.

1. Status of the evaluator. Is the evaluator independent and impartial? 
Half of the evaluations were conducted internally and half were commissioned from independent external evaluators. Status – whether internal or external – turned out to be no good predictor of impartiality and recognition of evaluation standards. While only one external evaluation explicitly referred to standards and addressed all the relevant questions (Berman and Marshall, 2011), some internal evaluations outplayed external evaluation in terms of impartiality. (For example, FIM (2007) compared to Pillinger (2014)).

2. Availability of the evaluation report. Is the evaluation available to the general public?
Seven evaluation reports were uploaded to a website and publicly available, although some reports could only be retrieved if those interested searched intentionally with the title of the campaign and varied the search terms several times. One report was provided by the project coordinating organization on request. Our research indicated that no repository – as instituted in other areas of social justice interventions for example by the UN Women’s Gender Equality Evaluation Portal, by the UNODC’s Cybercrime Repository, by the UNODC’s overview on in-depth evaluation or programs and by in-depth evaluation of projects – existed for EC-funded anti-trafficking interventions.
3. Stakeholder participation. Are all relevant stakeholders involved, their participation described and their legitimate interests protected? Stakeholder descriptions are well developed with regard to the participating organizations and their staff, but less so with regard to other groups. For example, one external evaluation conducted interviews with representatives of all participating partner organizations. Other possible stakeholders were not included, although a line of project activities had intended a participation of businesses. Only interviewed project partners speculated about possible reasons why businesses kept distance (Pillinger, 2014). External evaluations of Do-not-buy-from-children campaigns did not include the views and opinions of representatives of the ethnic minority that was visually exposed (Hatzinikolaou, 2015; Kuneviciute, 2012). An internal evaluation of a Reporting-campaign included the views of organizations involved in anti-trafficking efforts but not those of representatives of sex worker organizations (Zimmermann, 2008), as it was the case with FIM (2007).

4. Objectives of the evaluation. Are the objectives of the evaluation clearly stated? While six reports provided at least a minimum description of the objectives pursued by the evaluation, two reports did not clarify them. An evaluation – with limited time and resources – cannot be expected to address every potentially interesting question, but could realistically be expected to transparently describe the objectives and limits of the evaluation.

5. Intervention logic of the campaign. Are the project theory and intervention logic explicated or reconstructed? In all but one evaluation, the intervention logic of a campaign was not considered. As a rule, the expected outcomes and their causal relations to campaign activities were not defined. Accordingly, no indicators of achievements were determined. In the only evaluation that raised the issue of project theory of change, the evaluators found that no data were available for evidence-based judgement (Berman and Marshall, 2011).

6. Output, outcomes and the impact of campaigns. Are these addressed and observable or are measurable indications determined? All reports described the output of their corresponding campaigns, although with a high degree of variety. In some cases the report was restricted to the accounting of outputs (Pillinger, 2014). Other reports also considered any immediate or intermediate outcomes in terms of describing the various audiences exposed to the campaign (Czarnecki, 2016; Kuneviciute, 2012). Although most campaigns used websites for the dissemination of information and contact details, the website traffic data is rarely reported in such detail as it is in Czarnecki (2016).

In another case, the campaign included a telephone helpline-based reporting mechanism that generated a few hundred calls classified as related to human trafficking. This result was deemed a success although the external evaluator conceded that no baseline data were available. Moreover, since the evaluation report explains that the term “human trafficking-related” included not only notifications of
suspicions of trafficking but also for example requests by students for information (Hatzinikolaou, 2015), the reference to telephone calls as such is an inept indicator of achievement.

One report raised the issue of the extent to which campaign activities impact on trafficking in human beings, concluding that the available data and information do not allow any judgement to be made (Berman and Marshall, 2011: xix). Another evaluation provided details of the consequences of the notification of suspicions, including cases where prostitutes had been freed from sexual exploitation (FIM, 2007: 45).

In another internal evaluation report, incoming calls were individually documented for their content. This allowed for a detailed specification as to how many of these calls warranted the initial suspicion. However, the extent to which these calls led to a police investigation remained open (IOM Prague, 2008).

7. **Reliability. Is the reliability of the presented results discussed?**

While all evaluation reports made use of data provided by the campaigning organizations, only a few dealt explicitly with the limits of data compilation and documentation. Reservations mainly concerned the lack of baseline data (Hatzinikolaou, 2015).

8. **Efficiency. Are costs transparent and related to outcome or impact?**

Efficiency in the most general sense refers to a “measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to results” (OECD 2002: 21). We refer to output efficiency if there are no signs of a waste of resources for a given output (OECD, 2002: 20). Assessing output efficiency is an integral aspect of monitoring.

As an indicator for this output efficiency, evaluators pointed to declarations made by campaigners. In some evaluations, campaigns were considered to be particularly efficient because the performing organizations had invested additional resources. In these cases, a donor’s viewpoint was taken (Hatzinikolaou, 2015; Pillinger, 2014).

While output efficiency provides information about the use of resources by the campaign organizer, it does not indicate the efficiency of the campaign results. Outputs such as printed leaflets or organized press conferences are means to achieve results, but not an end in themselves. Campaign organizers can deliver perfect output without achieving the intended outcomes or impacts. We suggest that the term result efficiency should be used for any measures relating results (outcomes and impacts) to costs (valuated inputs). They can be used for comparisons with other campaigns with the same aims, or with other measures, in a bid to identify the most cost-effective way to obtaining a specific result (UNEG, 2005b: 13–14).

This presupposes that costs are made transparent. Most evaluation reports provided no information on how much input was made in financial terms and what exactly was achieved in quantifiable terms (although details of costs and outcomes are included in IOM Prague, 2008: 1, 6–8). With one exception, none of the evaluations even considered the relation between invested resources and outcomes achieved or impact, but the one evaluation which did conclude that an assessment
of the result efficiency was impossible due to the lack of data (Berman and Marshall, 2011).

9. Risks and side-effects. Are the possible side-effects and unintended consequences considered?\textsuperscript{42}

Three reports, all delivered by external evaluators, did not consider probable risks and side-effects. The two campaigns which sought to end the exploitation of begging children operated with images alluding to a marginalized ethnic minority without considering the risk of stigmatization (Hatzinikolaou, 2015; Kuneviciute, 2012). The third campaign confronted pub visitors with information printed on beer mats about a young girl who was sold into prostitution without considering whether and to what extent this message may have the boomerang-effect of implying that buying sex is widespread and common among men (Pillinger, 2014).

Five evaluations took a critical perspective, and also discussed possible side-effects and unintended consequences. For example, one internal evaluation reported on campaigners’ concerns that a film sequence aiming to make the public aware of the situation of women trafficked into sexual exploitation may run the risk that visualizing women in chains could be replicating a perpetrator’s gaze. Consequently, for the short trailer, the perspective of the camera captured – at least partly – the gaze of women who were offered for sale onto men bidding for them in a kind of market place. The internal evaluation thus recognized that campaigners were conscious of and had dealt with the risk of utilizing possibly counter-productive or misleading images (Zimmermann, 2008: 5). However, the conscious designing did not prevent observers from criticizing the visualization as stigmatizing for the women concerned (Kafehsy, 2014). Relating to this experience, one organization launching a similar campaign reported, in its internal campaign evaluation, that the issue of how to visualize the message had been intensively discussed (FIM, 2007). Another campaigning organization was concerned that a suspicion reported to a confidential helpline could risk leading to a false accusation if not handled sensitively (Czarnecki, 2016).

10. Final part. Are conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned explicitly linked to the findings presented?\textsuperscript{43}

The same five reports explicitly linked their judgement of the overall success of the campaign to findings presented in the evaluation, while the others indicated a successful measure without sufficient substantiation. Recommendations were also not always related to the evidence-based arguments presented in the evaluation. In one case, the internal evaluation of a telephone helpline for the reporting of suspicions of trafficking for sexual exploitation recommended the distribution of information on trafficking in human beings within educational institutions for the entire population, including boys. However, the campaign experiences did not deliver any evidence substantiating a chance of success for this proposal (IOM Prague, 2008). One report focused on the perspectives of the participating organizations and echoed their opinions when recommending the criminalization of commercial sex. However, the effects of this type of legislation were not subject to
evaluation (Pillinger, 2014). Similarly, another report contained the recommendation that the publicity of reporting mechanisms should be enhanced without specifying – based on the evidence and arguments of the evaluation – how this target might be realized in concrete terms (Czarnecki, 2016).

A few evaluations focused on the improvement of internal processes of campaigning. For example, one report recommended improving data compilation in order to achieve a sound basis for judgement, although it also deemed the campaign to be successful and worth continuing (Hatzinikolaou, 2015).

Only one report consistently produced recommendations which related to the explorative findings described in the evaluation report. The evaluators focused on the internal processes of the participating organizations recommending to enhance evaluable and abstaining from any other recommendations (Berman and Marshall, 2011).

4.4 A jigsaw synthesis of the effects of reporting campaigns

Having exposed the shortages of data and the shortcomings in the description and interpretation of data about campaigns in evaluation reports, we could simply conclude that we do not know whether and how demand-side campaigns contribute to the reduction of exploitation and trafficking in human beings. Certainly, we could join the choir of evaluators demanding an improvement in data compilation and documentation as a sound basis for judgement (Hatzinikolaou, 2015). However, we believe that even little insights from evaluation reports can be valuable for learning. In this section, we illustrate how a combination of evidence retrieved from different reports can contribute to learning even when the sample is small and the evidence base is weak.

Such learning-oriented explorations are also known as “best-evidence syntheses” which map information concerning outcomes in a theoretically informed way (Alton-Lee, 2004: 34). The basic idea is bringing together information on the effects of the same type of intervention from different sources like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. The observation that insights occur in a variety of contexts gives the analysis a particular strength. Systematic comparison – a basic technique in social-science methodology (Durkheim et al., 2014; Glaser and Strauss, 2009) – enhances reliability when a particular feature is observed in different contexts.

The jigsaw synthesis approach marks knowledge gaps and highlights existing insights in a structured way. This approach is in line with a proposal recently published by ICAT to improve measuring, evaluation and learning (MEL) in the field of anti-trafficking. ICAT called for a strategy to “capture, compile and operationalize what has been learned from the multiple counter-trafficking and related efforts employed to date – the accumulated knowledge of the sector. This knowledge is significant and can be put to work to inform design, development and decision-making about counter-trafficking strategies, policies, interventions, sectoral investments and MEL approaches” (ICAT, 2016: 5, italics in the original).
We demonstrate the application of the jigsaw puzzle approach only for reporting campaigns because information for spending campaigns was not sufficiently available. Table 2 presents the basic idea of the jigsaw puzzle approach.

Table 2 Availability of information on outcomes and impacts in reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FIM</th>
<th>ECPAT</th>
<th>VICTOR</th>
<th>IOM Prague</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exposure</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Awareness</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Understanding</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behavior</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact on the exploitative situation, the exploiter and the person exploited</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact on the trafficking situation, the trafficker and the person trafficked</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The authors.

In the table, the colored boxes visualize the availability of information. The table shows that all reports contained some information concerning the dimension of “behavior” in particular, while the dimension of “understanding” is only covered by only one report. While the table provides an overview on the availability of information, the content of information is presented in another table. Table 3 serves as an example, how findings regarding outcomes can be compiled.

Table 3 Presentation of findings regarding outcomes structured by intervention logic

| **Exposure** | • All campaigns targeted the media and received considerable coverage.  
• ECPAT addressed an estimated 15,000 persons with postings in and on social media (Czarnecki 2016).  
• IOM Prague (2008: 16) reported the distribution – at border crossings and at an exhibition of erotica – of 13,000 postcards. Advertisements on Prague’s public transport (serving, for example, 911,000 people a day), at the airport and in tunnels could potentially reach large numbers of people. |
| **Awareness** | • ECPAT recorded about 3,000 new visitors on the reporting website, with an average duration of 25 seconds. About one third reached it directly, probably responding to distribution of the contact details, and the remaining two-thirds via links; virtually no one accessed it via an Internet search (Czarnecki, 2016).  
• IOM Prague received more than 9,105 visitors on the campaign’s website during its seven-month duration (2008: 4).  
• FIM report 73,000 visitors to the campaign website, mostly reached via links from sex websites (2007: 41). |
| **Understanding** | • IOM Prague’s (2008: 6) reporting on the content of calls indicated that a number of callers (8 out of 32) thought that sexual services had been advertised – e.g. “A German client demands sex over the phone. After receiving an explanation of the helpline’s purpose, he apologizes.” |
| **Behavior** | • IOM Prague received 32 telephone calls and 28 e-mails (9 per month), including repeat contacts with the same person, requests and comments, for example on the grammar of the message (2008: 6–8).  
• The VICTOR information desks at four organizations in different countries received 362 THB-related contacts in 10 months (an average of 8 per organization per month), including requests and comments (Hatzinikolaou, 2015: 25).  
• ECPAT received 58 notifications in 18 months (an average of 3 per month), with a baseline of less than one per month before the campaign. Approximately half (29) were considered relevant. In six cases the suspicion of child trafficking for sexual exploitation in Germany or abroad was well-founded (Czarnecki, 2016).  
• In the seven months after the launch of the campaign, FIM received hundreds of information requests, 87 via the helpline (12 per month), of which 59 contained information about women in exploitative situations; 33 were considered as relevant suspicions compared to 1–2 relevant suspicions per year before the campaign (FIM, 2007: 42). |

Source: The authors.
Before we summarize the possible insights shown in Table 3, we present insights regarding impact in Table 4. In the first row, information is compiled on how the recommended behavior impacted on exploitative situations, exploiters and people exploited. The second row provides information on how the campaign impacts on trafficking in human beings.

**Table 4** Presentation of findings on impact structured by intervention logic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact on</th>
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</table>
| The exploitative situation, the exploiter and the person exploited | • FIM reported 15 cases of confirmed forced prostitution. In 6, the women were freed by the police and decided to testify, which led to the arrest of the perpetrators. In one case, a woman freed herself and did not want to testify. In 8 cases, the women decided to stay in the forced situation after being contacted. Altogether 36 cases were classified as containing serious indications of forced prostitution, but investigations were still ongoing, and women either returned to their current situation or were not willing to provide any information. No woman was deported (FIM, 2007: 45).  
• A handful of contacts led to discussion with the police and further investigation by NGOs, with two suspicions dismissed and other cases still open at the end of the campaign (IOM Prague, 2008: 6–8).  
• ECPAT reported 13 cases in which the police were informed (Czarnecki, 2016: 8). |
| The trafficking situation, the trafficker and the person trafficked | • ECPAT reported 6 cases of suspicion of trafficking for the sexual exploitation of minors (Czarnecki, 2016: 8). |

Source: The authors.

It should be kept in mind that the campaigns were conducted in different countries under very varied circumstances. However, the structured presentation of the findings provides some added value when it can display a particular feature identifiable in all contexts. In our case, the similar pattern of high input and modest impact on trafficking in human beings in the case of reporting campaigns is noteworthy, as they appeared in all circumstances.

Campaigns are known to have reached – in addition to groups believed to include a high share of the target group – large publics in the hundreds of thousands. Website clicks as an indicator of awareness of the message are in the thousands. Direct contacts via phone, post or website are in the range of 8 to 15 per month with, at best, half of them containing relevant suspicions and fewer initiating investigations. Only in one evaluation (FIM, 2007) was information provided that prompted investigations leading to people being freed from a forced situation.

Thus, we conclude that effects are funnel-shaped: a campaign’s message begins by reaching many people, but their numbers are narrowed down as the majority never result in observations that could trigger a report. In addition, the campaign triggers other types of contact – such as requests for information, messages commenting critically or positively on the campaign or helpline, or offers of cooperation that require and bind resources of the campaigning organizations. For us, however, this wide distribution triggers a question: Is public awareness really always a positive result of a campaign? It can also result in additional work for the campaign.
organizer, whose attention is then distracted from more targeted action in favor of helping victims of exploitation.

5. Conclusions

National and international organizations have long praised the role of evaluation in public policies (European Commission, 2015: 49; Hughes and Niewenhuis, 2005: 9). In view of this commitment to evaluation, it is surprising how few anti-trafficking projects were thoroughly evaluated. Evaluation is particularly rare for demand-side campaigns and often does not comply with established evaluation standards. Against this background, it seems obvious to call for more intensive and professional evaluation efforts as a former OSCE Special Representative on Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings (2004–2006) did: “What is needed, is independent external objective evaluation; evaluation that is based on professional methodology and standards, informed by trafficking expertise. Evaluation is the single most critical addition necessary to strengthen anti-trafficking work; resources for evaluation must be an integral part of all anti-trafficking projects” (Konrad, 2011: 3).

Contrarily, our study does not support this ambitious claim for the external evaluation of all anti-trafficking projects. The analysis of evaluation efforts in the field of anti-trafficking interventions revealed – in contradiction to a widely shared conviction among evaluation experts (Davy, 2016: 500) – that some internal evaluation reports were more instructive and critical than commissioned external evaluation. We found instances in which external evaluators offered affirmative statements of success without any empirical foundation, while internal evaluators critically assessed and shared problematic experiences. A policy which follows a watering-can principle of showering time and resources for external evaluation to each and every project is not convincing. Each evaluation will then be poorly resourced and findings will be accordingly limited. In view of the results presented, it is more convincing to select a share of funded projects for a more intensive external evaluation. In order to ensure organizational learning for and from all projects, we encourage donors to support project applicants in the designing of evaluable projects and in internal evaluation efforts taking into account the basic guidelines of UNEG norms and standards.

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Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Disclosure Statement
The authors declare that no financial interest or benefit has been arising from the direct applications of their research.

NOTES

5. https://www.iom.int/evaluations
6. This definition differs slightly from that quoted by Raab and Rocha (2011: 7): “A campaign is an organized effort to bring public pressure to bear on institutions and individuals so as to influence their actions, as institutions are influenced via the individuals involved and some campaigns aim primarily to change knowledge and attitudes (that might later lead to a change in behavior).”
9. This effect is also raised by Merton (1936) and more systematically elaborated on by Goffman (1959)
10. In the field of anti-trafficking initiatives, the relevant UN body UNODC refers explicitly to the UNEG framework for the evaluation of UNODC-funded projects and programmes. UNODC provides evaluators with an online handbook that ensures that they are completely familiar with the required principles and standards as set out in UNEG norms and standards (UNODC, 2012) and proposes a wide range of tools for different stages of an evaluation.
11. There are many definitions indicating the different evaluation perspectives (Mark et al., 2006: 6) so this is a minimum commonality.
12. In this view, impact is the last item in a logical chain. If impact is defined solely as something happening in the long term, for example after two years (Dottridge, 2007b: 5), there would be the need to invent a new term for the effect that is the ultimate aim of the intervention. Using impacts only for “lasting” effects (Raab and Rocha, 2011: 290) is methodologically problematic, since it is difficult to say at the time of an evaluation study what will be long-lasting. In a recent EU staff working document, the consideration of impacts is only discussed with regard to future policies and programmes (ex-ante-impact-evaluation) (European Commission, 2015), focusing on intended changes in the problem to be tackled and effects in other fields.
13. However, the campaign intervention logic (or logic model) is part of a theory of change.
14. For reconstructing the intervention logics of campaigns, Coffman’s stage model and its visualisation has been adopted with some adjustments. The main adjustment concerns the relation between the objectives at different stages of the campaign. The different types
of objective are not formulated in a temporal sequence (‘short-term,” “long-term’)) but in a logical sequential way with regard to the degree of directness (“immediate,” “intermediate,” “final”).

15. According to Lainez (2010: 135), a “close look at representations of ‘child prostitution’ or ‘child trafficking’ in South-East Asia reveals the existence of a standard portrayal of the sexually exploited child. Denunciation campaigns first target sex tourism involving children and then human trafficking has massively used stereotypes.” These simplifier, anecdotal and tear-shedding clichés “have led to elaborating a polished image of the victim whose testimony has been presented as an irrefutable proof of a topic perceived as intolerable.”


17. For a discussion of the ILO study, see (Vogel, 2016).

18. For example, an anti-trafficking project in Germany produced cinema spots to draw attention to trafficking for labor exploitation. In three spots, hotel cleaning, building and restaurant work were presented as suspicious situations, with actors in work-wear presented as ghost-like transparent bodies.

19. For more elaborate theoretical analysis of field-specific effects see Cyrus and Vogel (2017a).

20. See, for example, observations on the difficult situation of Moroccan children and youth sent to Spain (Rogoz, 2016). The article discusses, inter alia, situations of neglect in the family after return for “family reunification” and problematic “fosterage” arrangements in Spain.

21. Trafficking victim can receive at best temporary relief from deportation during the court procedure.

22. We are grateful to students Mona Schiele and Anna Schander for their web-search assistance.


24. We cannot rule out the possibility that further campaigns exist that did not respond to the framing of the search.

25. Originally, the idea was to focus on twelve campaigns that were indicated to us as being either particularly successful, unsuccessful or contested by partners and stakeholders in the field, including the coordinator. This turned out to be an unfeasible strategy, as respondents were unable or reluctant to make such statements. Therefore, the selection strategy had to be adjusted.

26. The study on prevention initiatives suggests building a repository of project materials (Deloitte, 2015: 90).

27. The gender- and age-specific emphasis of anti-trafficking campaigns is also indicated by O’Brien (2013).

28. For an earlier version of this study, previous UNEG publications were used (UNEG, 2005a; 2005b).

29. UNEG 2016, Norms 4 and 5.

30. UNEG 2016, Norm 7.

31. “The Gender Equality Evaluation Portal makes available more than 350 evaluations on what works to achieve gender equality and women’s empowerment. It serves as a tool to strengthen and promote the exchange of evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations with stakeholders and potential users in order to have a wider impact on learning
and to contribute to improved policy design and programming in the area of gender equality,” see: http://genderevaluation.unwomen.org/en.

32. “The cybercrime repository is a central data repository of cybercrime laws and lessons learned for the purposes of facilitating the continued assessment of needs and criminal justice capabilities and the delivery and coordination of technical assistance” (see https://www.unodc.org/cld/index-sherloc-les.jspx?tmpl=cyb).


34. “Independent Project Evaluations are initiated and managed by Project Managers, and conducted by independent external evaluator(s). Independent Project Evaluations must be based on the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime evaluation guidelines and templates, as well as UNEG Norms and Standards” (see http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/independent-project-evaluations.html).

35. UNEG 2016, Standards 1.3 and 4.6.
36. UNEG 2016, Standard 4.3.
37. UNEG 2016, Standard 4.2.
38. UNEG 2016, Norm 3.

39. The term “impact” is used also in other studies, but refers to all sorts of potential consequences of a campaign, for example to the number of people who are made aware of the size of the phenomenon of child trafficking (Hatzinikolaou, 2015: 35).

40. UNEG 2016, Norm 3 and Standard 4.2.
41. UNEG 2016: 10.
42. See UNEG 2016: 10.
43. UNEG 2016, Norm 3.

44. For the latter purpose, we have developed a manual the aim of which is to act as an instrument of support for NGOs in the design of evaluable anti-trafficking campaigns (Cyrus and Vogel, 2017b).

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**Annex**

List of anti-trafficking campaigns with reference to a demand-side

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Availability of evaluative information</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Short name of campaign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>External evaluation</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>• Stop Traffick! Beermat campaign (ICI);</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• VICTOR (Smile of the Child)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Open your eyes – be aware (Tdh);</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Buy responsibly (IOM);</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Internal evaluation</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>• Don’t look away (ECPAT);</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Stop Forced Prostitution (FIM);</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• EURO 08 (Fiz),</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Don’t be afraid to say it for her (IOM Prague);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fragmented evaluative information</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>• Blue Blindfold IE;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Appearances are deceptive (Crimestoppers NL)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Victime ou témoin de Traite d’Etres Humains (City of Geneva)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Abpffiff – final whistle blow (German Women’s Council),</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Red Card for sexual Exploitation and Forced Labour (SOLWODI),</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Used in Europe (LSI)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Campaigns addressing behavior change without evaluative information</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>• What do you know about trafficking? (BBGM)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Taxis against trafficking (Stop the Traffic)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Combatting Trafficking in Women for Labour Exploitation in Domestic work (EDEX Cyprus)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Action Against Forced Prostitution (Diakonie Germany)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• BRISEIS (Portuguese Association for victim support (PT))</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Prostitution without coercion and violence (Ban Ying),</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Be a Hero (Diakonie Bremen)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Interventions and campaigns not addressing behavior change</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>• Comprehensive Corporate Toolkit (SAMILIA Foundation);</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Applied-indepth research (IOM Finland);</td>
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<td>• GendeRIS (Giacomo Brodolino Foundation IT)</td>
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<td>• Sensitizing People (GCV);</td>
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<td>• GIRL (CPE Romania),</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• If you hire a prostitute (Luxemburg),</td>
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<td>• Safety Compas (Marta Centre Latvia),</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Third sector (CNCA)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Unsichtbar (Projekt Unsichtbar)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>No available information</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>• Dignity (ICI),</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Please Disturb (Roel Simons),</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Way out with you (CATW),</td>
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<td>• The no project</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Be a responsible traveller</td>
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<td>• Blue Heart Campaign</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Not for sale</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• You can delete trafficking 2009 (Italy),</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Trafficking does not forgive (Italy);</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• To Exploit Work is a crime (Hungary),</td>
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<td>• The way out 2006 (Hungary),</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• People are no good (Bulgaria),</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• People are no good (Denmark),</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Who is paying the price 2008 (Denmark)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Begging Handicaps my Future (BkTF Coalition Albania)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Begging – if it concerns a child, it concerns all of us (City of Milano),</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• &quot;Dając pieniądze odbierasz dzieciństwo&quot; ['When you give money you deprive children of their childhood'] (Cracow),</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Stop begging [Stop żebraćtwu] (Warsaw),</td>
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<tr>
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<td>• Dając pieniędzy nie pomagasz ['When you give money you don’t help] (Wroclaw),</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• ‘Killing with Kindness” (City of London),</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• “Your money will not help begging children. It will only help those who force them to beg” (IOM),</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• “Your money makes the traffickers rich...Your money kills souls!” (ANITP Romania),</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• “You can back out but she?” (Hungary, Ministry of Interior),</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• “We don’t buy it” (Reach, Ireland)</td>
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<td>• Cites</td>
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